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use of WeAponized unmAnned AeriAl veHiCles (uAVs) 
supported By gis As A groWing terrorist tHreAt
Abstract: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are one of the most advanced achievements of 
modern technology widely used by contemporary states. They have developed as an important tool 
for national security and commercial industries. Although they offer immense security benefits, 
UAVs can also open up new threats and opportunities in conducting terrorist attacks. The increased 
use in both state and private sectors reduces the cost of the UAVs therefore making them easily 
accessible tools for terrorist organizations. The pioneering attacks conducted by Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria – ISIS (2016) have highlighted the capability of terrorist organizations and indi-
vidual terrorists to deploy commercially available UAVs in order to attack their state adversaries.
Even though the first ISIS UAV operations focused on conducting reconnaissance operations 
in Iraq and Syria, the organization continued further and started using them to attack Kurdish, 
Iraqi and Turkish forces. This is only an isolated case and so far these type of terrorist attacks 
have-not happened on the scale that can terrorize a big mass of people or cause greater civilian 
or military damage, However, ISIS is not the only user of UAVs. Their use by Hezbollah and 
alleged assassination attempt on Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro (2018) proved that other 
terrorist organizations and militant groups have also adopted the use of UAVs. They could further 
use weaponized UAVs an, to achieve even worst scenarios than the assassination of a country 
leader, in terms of possible conduct of chemical or biological attacks by home-grown terrorists 
on numerous public venues in contemporary states.The factors affecting the expansion of the 
weaponzed UAV s supported by GIS and the risk of their use as a growing terrorist threat will be 
examined in this paper.
Key words: UAV, GIS, threat, terrorism, security.
Introduction
The use of UAV’s by terrorist or militant Islamist organizations is not a 
new phenomenon. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
UAV’s were viewed not only as a weapon but as a real threat to the security of 
Western allies and their installations in the current regional conflicts. In its 
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2006 National Strategy Against Terrorism, the US State Secretariat states that 
terrorists are effective in adapting modern technology to carry out terrorist 
attacks with massive consequences and effects[1]. As a rising terrorist threat, 
the proliferation of UAV’s was the subject of the 114th US Congress held on 
June 24, 2015, and resulted in a directive to the Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity - processed by the Secretaries of Defense, Transportation, Energy and 
Regulatory Affairs. Nuclear Energy Commission - to make an appropriate 
security assessment. The focus of the said directive is on how commercially 
available UAV’s could be used in an attack, as well as the ability to prevent 
and reduce the risk of such and similar attacks.
As a rising terrorist threat, the proliferation of UAV’s was the subject of 
the 114th session of the US Congress held on June 24, 2015, and resulted in a 
directive to the Secretary of Homeland Security - working with the Secretar-
iats on the potential threat of the European continent in question. The best 
indication is the incident that occurred on September 15, 2013, during the 
pre-election campaign in Germany. Standing in front of its own supporters 
and supporters in Dresden, the UAV’s - previously flipping the rally - literally 
collapsed at the feet of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Defense Minister 
Thomas de Mezir. Although UAV’s was driven by members of the opposition 
Pirate Party - in protest against the national surveillance program using 
UAV’s, Euro Hawk - the event itself more than realistically presented potential 
security implications and limited opportunities. to prevent terrorist attacks 
of this or similar type. As Merkel followed the event with a smile for the 
global security community, the incident was a warning that the use of UAV’s, 
posed a new and serious threat to public security. This thesis was confirmed 
on August 4, 2018 when the first attempted assassination of a state leader 
using a commercially available UAV’s with a previously well-prepared and 
analyzed GIS mission was recorded in Caracas. According to official reports, 
shortly after the first explosion that interrupted Maduro's speech, Venezuelan 
security forces reportedly shot down two more armed UAV’s in an attempt to 
liquidate the President. Immediately after the attack, the little-known group 
"National Movement of Soldiers in T-shirts" claimed responsibility. Through 
several posts on social networks, the group reportedly planned to use two 
UAV’s that were disabled and shot down by sniper fire.
Like the security services, UAV’s has always been the subject of analysis 
by the global academic community, especially today when market availability 
has greatly increased the risk of being used as a key weapon in future terrorist 
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attacks. Starting with the 1991 Gulf War, continuing with NATO intervention in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1998), and 
especially in the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UAV’s received a 
firearm that significantly changed the concept of warfare. In addition to their 
use as an effective tool for gathering intelligence, identifying, and marking 
military objectives in the above conflicts following prior GIS analysis, UAV’s 
have also been used to destroy strategic installations or terrorist leaders with 
specific GIS information obtained. The first armed bomb attack was registered 
on 04 February 2002 in Pakita province, Afghanistan, where the target of the 
attack, near the city of Kost, was then al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.[2]
In fact, UAV’s opened a new chapter in the concept of warfare. We have 
seen above that the UAV’s initially allowed conventional armed forces to carry 
out surveillance and combat missions from a safe distance, but we also saw 
that in the following period the UAV’s would be similarly used by terrorist and 
militant organizations. The fact that the UAV’s has the potential to carry out a 
terrorist attack with the worst possible scenario has resulted in new security 
threats and challenges for Western allies. In this context, in the remainder 
of the text, we will first analyze the genesis of the threat in question, look at 
the factors that contributed to its mass proliferation by analyzing the use of 
GIS, and finally see the risk of this threat to the security of the Western Allies.
The genesis of the threat
As we have already pointed out in the introductory section, ID is not the 
first and only terrorist or militant organization to have used armed UAV’s in 
pursuit of its own goals. In fact, terrorist and militant Islamist organizations 
have been using UAV’s for more than a decade. Beginning in 2004, Hezbollah 
begins using the UAV’s in Israeli airspace to gather intelligence and attack 
various targets[3]. In November 2004, using a Mirsad-1 type UAV’s, Hezbollah 
for the first time succeeded in conducting a reconnaissance mission over 
the city of Naharia in Western Galilee, without being intercepted by Israeli 
anti-air defenses[4]. Similarly, in April 2005, using the same type of UAV’s, 
Hezbollah is conducting its second successful scouting flight in Israeli air-
space[5]. Unlike the first two, in April 2006, Hezbollah made its third flight, 
also the first attempt to attack strategic targets in Israel. Namely, Hezbollah 
launched three Ababil-type[6] UAV’s, each armed with 25-30kg of explosives 
and metal fragments that would enhance the killing effect on the target. One 
UAV’s managed to break into the suburbs of Haifa - a Mediterranean port city 
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with a population of about 300,000 - before being located and shot down by 
Israel aviation.
Although abruptly discontinued in 2006, Hezbollah's campaign to disrupt 
Israeli airspace was renewed in October 2012. Namely, the Ayub-type[7] UAV’s 
after launching from Lebanon, across the Mediterranean, the Gaza Strip and 
the Negev Desert, covering an area of about 300km a previously well-analyzed 
GIS route following, penetrated the city of Dimona where it was intercepted 
and destroyed by the Israeli Air Force. Weeks after the event, an Iranian 
official released photos of the Dimona nuclear complex and linked them to 
the recently used Hezbollah UAV’s. From a labor point of view, this example 
is extremely important because Hezbollah first searched the Israeli nuclear 
facility at a nuclear facility, near the city of Dimona. At the same time, the 
event is a strong propaganda victory for Iran, but also a message that Hezbol-
lah has cutting edge technology that can be used to attack targets of strategic 
importance to Israel. However, Hezbollah's first successful armed attack on 
Hezbollah was not aimed at Israel but in Syria. According to available infor-
mation, on September 21, 2014, Hezbollah carried out a successful attack with 
an armed UAV’s on the positions of the Jabhat al-Nusra / al-Nusra Front in the 
Lebanese border town of Arsal, killing 23 militants from the militant Islamist 
group. This example will go down in history as the first attack on an armed 
UAV’s by a non-state actor, but at the same time an event that has hinted that 
the technological gap between Western allies and militant groups is gradu-
ally diminishing. Two years later, this thesis was backed up when Hezbollah 
launched its first armed UAV’s attack outside Lebanon, more precisely in the 
northwestern Syrian province of Aleppo. On August 9, a media outlet close 
to the organization released a video showing an attack on a command post by 
opposition forces in the city of Kalsa, using an unknown type of armed UAV’s 
with complete control and maneuvering by GIS coordinates[8].
The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas - is the second 
militant Islamist organization that not only implemented the use of Iranian 
UAV’s but went on to develop its own program and production. In November 
2012, the Israeli Air Force attacked eight sites in the town of Khan Younis in 
the Gaza Strip, destroying operational and UAV’s in the process of develop-
ment and testing. According to official reports, the destroyed UAV’s had an 
operational radius of 10km from the Gaza Strip, making Tel Aviv a relatively 
easy target. In 2012-2014, more attempts were launched to launch an He-
bron-launched UAV’s and attack targets in Israel that were timely prevented 
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by the Israeli security forces. In July 2014 in the Gaza Strip, Hamas launched 
for the first time two Ababil-1 type armed UAV’s fully backed by guided missile 
flight through previous GIS, which were intercepted and destroyed by Israeli 
air defense shortly before the attack. near Ashdod and Ashkelon. Armed with 
four air-to-ground missiles, the main objective of the UAV’s was the Israeli 
Ministry of Defense headquarters in Tel Aviv[9]. After claiming responsibility 
for the planned attack, Hamas for the first time publicly acknowledged that 
it had its own production UAV’s, which were publicly presented in December 
2014 during a parade organized on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of 
the organization. However in December 2016, Hamas's UAV’s development 
program suffered a serious setback when Tunisia killed Muhammad Al-Zo-
rai - a Tunisian UAV’s engineer and expert - one of the founders of the UAV’s 
Technology Development Program in the Gaza Strip.
As of October 2016, when the ID was first using armed UAV’s, besides Hez-
bollah and Hamas, no other militant organization had carried out a similar 
attack. For example, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda 
have primarily focused on developing strategies and technologies for defense 
against the armed UAV’s. On the other hand, the Front al-Nusra, Ajnad al-sham 
and the ID, using UAV’s, have documented a growing number of battles and 
individual suicide attacks on targets of government forces in Syria. Unlike 
the first two, ID continues to follow in the footsteps of Hezbollah and Hamas 
and not only launches reconnaissance missions and target attacks in Syria 
and Iraq, but launches its own armed UAV’s development program as a new 
tactic to carry out terrorist attacks globally level.
In October 2016, in the fight against Kurdish forces north of Mosul, the 
ID for the first time used an armed UAV’s, killing two Kurdish fighters and 
wounding as many French soldiers. According to agency reports, convinced 
that it was another of the large numbers of UAV’s used by IS to search the area 
north of Mosul, after the aircraft was shot down, Kurdish forces transported 
it to their base, in an attempt to further investigate it, plane exploded. The 
intensity of the ID Campaign against the Iraqi Armed Forces increased signifi-
cantly in January 2017, when through its own online media, the ID officially 
unveiled a program to use the UAV’s as an innovative tactic in the fight against 
Iraqi and Kurdish forces in Iraq. The video "Knigts of the Dawawin" aired on 
the Shumoukh Al-Islam internet forum shows more attacks by armed IDBs 
on Iraqi positions at various locations . Interpreting them as a "nightmare" 
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for "unbelievers", ID shows GIS-backed attacks on military equipment and 
personnel, while emphasizing the murderous effect on the targets selected.
However, losing control of the occupied territories in Iraq, ID lost the 
initial momentum that resulted in a reduction in the intensity of the use of 
armed UAV’s. However, ID has put UAV’s in the focus of its propaganda policy, 
massively displaying video clips of armed UAV’s attacks or suicide operations 
whose primary purpose is not only to promote but also to encourage future 
suicide attacks. In this context, on February 1, 2017, the Internet media site 
"Sawa'eq" published a poster showing IDs of attacking and destroying more 
American landmarks, including the Statue of Liberty in New York and Congress 
Capitol headquarters in Washington. Similarly, on February 12, 2018, using the 
social platform Telegram, ID supporters called for the use of armed UAV’s to 
attack "apostates and infidels" in the Arab world and the West. In the appeal, 
ID supporters are urged to procure any explosive-carrying UAV’s that can be 
used to attack a factory, police car, gas stations, warehouses, shopping malls 
and energy facilities[10]. On October 13, 2018, the online media outlet Al-Ansar 
published a threatening poster titled "Await for our surprises". The poster 
showing the Eiffel Tower as a target, besides a gunman with ID, also shows a 
UAV’s carrying additional load, possibly explosive or any weapon.
Not with standing the dwindling operational opportunities and heavy 
international pressure it was exposed to in 2017, ID continued to improve its 
UAV’s and offensive attacks in Iraq and Syria. In March 2018, Arab media pub-
lished original documents seized from an ID headquarters in northern Syria, 
according to Fadel Mansour (known as Abu Yusri Al-Tunisi) - a Tunisian-born 
engineer - working to increase the weight of the IDB's cargo can carry up 
to 20 kg. Furthermore, on October 24, 2017, the ID attacked and completely 
destroyed a Syrian Army ammunition depot located at the football stadium in 
the city of Deir ez-Zor. According to the effect achieved, this attack is probably 
the greatest achievement that ID has been able to achieve since the use of 
armed UAV’s so far. Among other things, it is obvious that the UAV’s program 
is also a propaganda tool that ID shows as a strong and ruthless adversary, 
thereby boosting the morale of its own fighters, attracting more supporters 
and recruiting more fighters.
Factors
To determine the factors that influence the expansion, we need to answer 
the question of what makes the UAV’s attractive to terrorist and militant Isla-
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mist organizations? The answer to this question is simple because the reasons 
are the same for both state and non-state actors. For both of them, armed 
UAV’s are a cheap and safe method of attacking various targets without risking 
the safety of the personnel who manage them. While the effects of the above 
examples are incomparably small compared to the effects that terrorist and 
militant Islamist organizations achieve in suicide attacks, nonetheless armed 
UAV’s offer a wide range of purposes in a variety of environments - including 
urban areas - without unnecessarily sacrificing staff. Similar to suicide attacks 
and other innovations in terrorism, the use of armed UAV’s is highly likely to 
be widely accepted by terrorist and militant Islamist organizations globally, 
especially given the mass use of commercially available UAV’s. According to 
some estimates, in 2016 around 2.2 million GDP were sold globally, while by 
2020 this figure is expected to increase threefold and reach 7 million[11].
Regardless of the fact that these numbers refer to small UAV’s - most com-
monly multicopters - it should still be taken into account that they are quite 
sophisticated, with various types of built-in sensors, advanced satellite navi-
gation systems supported by modern GIS that allow them to be programmed 
to fly on a pre-planned route and carry an additional load of 0.5-20 kg. In 
terms of labor, it is interesting to note that Amazon's largest online store 
offers commercial UAV’s that can carry up to 10 kg[12]. With UAV’s of this 
kind available, terrorist or militant Islamist organizations and individuals 
can easily arm them, program them for the intended purpose without being 
directly exposed to the action of the embedded explosive device.
External logistical and technical assistance is another factor influenc-
ing the expansion of the threat in question. Thanks to the support of Iran, 
Hezbollah and Hamas have not only succeeded in carrying out armed UAV’s 
combat missions in Israel and the Lebanese border area to Syria, but have also 
developed their own production facilities located on safe locations in the Gaza 
Strip and Lebanon. Furthermore, the war in Syria enabled Hezbollah to not 
only continue to use armed UAV’s but, thanks to Russian and Iranian experts, 
to refine this innovative tactic. In this context, in a February 2017 interview 
with Middle East Eye, a Hezbollah official said that working with Iranians 
and Russians, the organization is daily refining the tactics and techniques of 
applying UAV’s to Syria's battlefields to the most up-to-date GIS available [13].
GIS is widely used in almost all the branches of the modern armies, but 
this is available and for almost every terroristic organization online. So, one 
of the ways of data gathering is by aerial photographs and space images. 
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Advantage of these kind of collecting data is the possibility of gaining infor-
mation without getting any contact with the earth surface directly, but with 
contacting a mediatory unit carrying information about the surface. As that 
kind of mediatory unit which carry an assessing equipment to gain informa-
tion are today's popular unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV’s) commonly known 
as a drone. With a proper equipment they can be used to observe and make 
a live photographs of the terrain of interest which is part of crisis area. This 
method will reduce the usage of people risking their life for the purpose of 
collecting information.
Image 2: Model of Geo-reconnaissance and commanding (GRC) information system 
which is used by the terroristic organization with online information[14]
Unlike Hezbollah and Mossad, ID has developed its own program to use 
UAV’s without external, or state, support. In addition to simplicity and cre-
ativity in terms of engineering design, another key factor that influenced the 
development and refinement of the IDU's UAV’s program was the takeover 
and control of large territory in Iraq and Syria. Controlling several key cities, 
military bases, and production facilities - civilian and military - IDs gained 
space and opportunity for their own and cheaper production of various 
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program support components that was further supported by the purchase of 
commercially available UAV’Ss and spare parts. Based on documents seized by 
Iraqi forces in the vicinity of Mosul, ID attempted to standardize operations 
and institutionalize data related to the development plan of the UAV’s. For 
illustration only, one of the documents contained a checklist of pre- and post-
flight procedures, mission data, team composition, location and trajectory 
of UAV’s. Among other things, the program envisioned the procurement not 
only of multicopters but also of fixed-wing UAV’s that have a higher operating 
radius and greater payload than multicopters.
Risk
From the examples given in the genesis of the threat in question, we have 
seen that Hezbollah, Hamas and even IDs have already used their own fleet of 
UAV’S outside the territory they control. While it is purely an opportunistic 
attack and the reconnaissance of military targets in conflict areas, any public 
place, element of critical infrastructure, public institution or state leader in 
modern states could be considered as a potential target[15]. The risk of such a 
scenario has never been ruled out by the Western Allies' security services. In 
2015, US and UK intelligence provided evidence that terrorist organizations 
were planning to launch a bomb attack on public places such as football 
matches or festivals. In this context, the discovery of the abandoned fixed-wing 
UAV’s ID workshop in Ramadi in February 2016 is additional evidence that 
only confirms the risk of the above scenarios. In July 2016, active members 
of the al-Minbar al-I`lami al-Jihadi jihadist forum claimed that ID members 
had informed them that the organization had developed a UAV’S armed with 
rockets and other explosive devices.
As for possible attack scenarios, there are various methods that depend 
primarily on the type of weaponry (conventional/unconventional) and the 
technical characteristics of the UAV’s used by terrorist and militant Islamist 
organizations and individuals. In this regard, Hezbollah and Hamas use 
partially more advanced UAV’s than IDs and have greater capacity to launch 
a planned attack at a greater distance. However, taking into account the cre-
ativity of ID and its globally distributed propaganda, in addition to explosive 
devices, the UAV’S that the organization uses can easily be adapted to attack 
various radioactive, chemical and biological (RFB) agents in the form of so-
called. "Dirty bomb". In this context, in June 1994, the Japanese sect Aum Hin-
richiko had its first unsuccessful attempt to release a nerve agent Sarin using 
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a remote-controlled helicopter equipped with an interrogation mechanism 
[16]. A similar or similar scenario for the use of armed UAV’S should not be 
ruled out today, especially given the examples and experiments with the use 
of chemical weapons by ID, and especially its interest in the production of 
biological agents. Despite the fact that no mass effects have been registered, 
a number of media outlets have proliferated reports that ID in Syria is not 
only using blunt poisons, but also has developed its own chemical weapons 
production program, backed by engineers with extensive experience. The most 
notable among them is Abu Malik, a chemical weapons expert who, before 
joining al-Qaeda in 2005, worked on Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons 
development and production program. He was killed in January 2015 during 
an air strike by coalition forces in Syria.
The liquidation of Abu Malik is not the only obstacle to the ID for the 
use of chemical, radiological or biological weapons against Western allies. 
Their storage and transport to potential targets without the use of dedicated 
containers and special premises that provide stable conditions for agents. It 
is for this reason that IDs are more likely to use radiological, chemical and 
biological (RFB) weapons with the use of UAV’S immediately after its pro-
duction in the immediate vicinity of the potential target. All of this initiates 
additional logistical requirements such as procuring the necessary materials, 
proper UAV’S and, of course, recruiting local experts, but also an increased 
risk of intelligence being detected by the intelligence services. However, the 
ID's readiness to use RSD weapons poses a real risk to the Western Allies' 
internal security. Immediately after the second terrorist attack on ID in Paris 
in November 2015, the risk of this threat was highlighted by French Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls. Addressing the French Parliament, Val touched on a 
wide range of possibilities for the use of weapons of mass destruction by ID, 
particularly emphasizing the risk of chemical and biological attack. At the 
same time, his statement calls into question the effectiveness of long-running 
paradigms that cannot be dealt with by the innovation of IDs and which in 
a very short time can become obsolete and not deliver the desired effects in 
the fight against terrorism.
Conclusion
The development and advancement of 21-st century BPM technology has 
offered them an alternative method and a perfect opportunity to achieve the 
goals of terrorist and militant organizations. Recent advances in state-of-the-
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art technology have allowed UAV’s to operate autonomously and perform a 
wide range of conventional and unconventional operations without the in-
volvement of manpower. Hezbollah and Hamas 'pioneering efforts, as well as 
ID's ability to develop its own UAV’S production program, showed that states' 
monopoly on the use of force is slowly eroding and that modern technology 
is reducing the gap between state and non-state actors. Although UAV's ID 
development program has been under pressure from coalition forces and 
suffered serious consequences, its achievements described above testify to 
the organization's ability to make use of commercially available UAV’s and 
adequate expert support.
Unrestricted access to up-to-date UAV’s at affordable prices and the online 
proliferation of information on armaments not only do not exclude them, 
but also pose a serious threat to the security of Western allies that have the 
potential to cause significant harm. Identifying the risk, Western Allied state 
leaders emphasized the need for urgent security policy reforms, necessary to 
suppress armed UAV’s as a growing terrorist threat.
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